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A prominent issue in the internationalization of Chinese firms is that many are state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and that corporate governance in China is highly 
idiosyncratic. This paper identifies firm characteristics, industry effects and corporate 
governance mechanisms that foster internationalization. We find that Chinese cross-
border mergers create shareholder value, but not more than domestic expansions. 
Corporate governance mechanisms matter, jointly and individually. While state-
ownership predicts fewer cross-border mergers, a favourable board structure and 
corporate transparency explains higher M&A returns. As in more mature markets, 
firm- and industry-specific determinants also affect M&As in China. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2005, Graham and Pettis asked the question: “who’s afraid of CNNOC (China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation)?” and started a media frenzy. The general perception has been that 
Chinese firms acquire foreign companies and assets at an alarming rate. The main issue of the 
internationalization of Chinese firms is that most are state-owned enterprises (SOEs); hence, 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms are very different. In contrast to 
research in political economy and corporate governance, the literature in international 
business and finance often approaches the internationalization of Chinese firms more 
generically without accounting for the peculiarities of the Chinese governance system (Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005). An exception is the study by Cui and Jiang (2009) that contends that 
SOEs face barriers to enter foreign markets due to local political opposition. 
Our study goes beyond the distinction of SOEs and private entities and incorporates a 
broad range of corporate governance measures. It focuses on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
of Chinese companies and hence a particular mode of entry. Apart from studying cross-border 
M&A, it also includes domestic transactions to analyse differences in underlying drivers and 
success. Only a few studies focus on outward FDI and they use aggregated data (Liu et al., 
2005). In contrast, our study compiles firm-level data on cross-border M&A. In particular, the 
study tests the impact of three theoretical perspectives on the internationalization through 
M&A and its success. The first perspective underlines the importance of external and internal 
governance mechanisms and is based on the corporate governance and political economy 
literature. Second, by drawing on the Resource-based View, we incorporate firm specific 
proxies that contribute to better access to resources and capabilities, including the firm’s past 
acquisition experience and financing capabilities. Third, industry specific effects can 
influence the degree and success of internationalization.  
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Our contribution is threefold. First, this paper extends the FDI literature by analyzing 
the determinants of cross-border M&A initiated by Chinese acquirers. Joint hypothesis tests 
confirm that not only governance mechanisms, but also firm- and industry-specific factors 
affect the decision to acquire foreign assets. Second, this paper adds to the international 
diversification literature by analyzing the determinants and performance of Chinese cross-
border acquirers. In particular, it supports recent evidence on the internationalization of 
emerging market multinationals (Aybar and Ficici, 2009) by showing that Chinese cross-
border M&As do not create more shareholder value than domestic transactions. For domestic 
M&A, these results also add to the limited but growing literature on Chinese M&A 
performance. Third, with regard to the corporate governance literature, in particular for 
emerging markets multinationals, the paper identifies governance mechanisms with 
explanatory power: the decision to acquire foreign assets is negatively affected by state 
ownership and positively by the separation of the positions of CEO and chairman of the 
board. The latter governance mechanism also influences the success of M&A. In addition, 
corporate transparency measured by disclosure of executives’ compensation and issuing 
shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H-shares) enhances M&A performance. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second section develops the conceptual 
framework, followed by the development of hypotheses in Section 3. The fourth section 
discusses the dataset and construction of variables. Section 5 reports and discusses the 
empirical results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The conceptual framework 
Cui and Jiang (2009) conduct a survey of 138 Chinese firms and determine whether firms 
choose joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries to enter foreign markets. While they 
survey firms that internationalized, we focus on the first step, whether firms internationalize 
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and how successful they are in doing this. Our study refers to M&A and thus ignores 
greenfield investments, which is due to two reasons. First, before the start of our sample 
period (in 1999), 83% of all FDI was conducted through M&A (UNCTAD, 2000, p.14). 
Hence, the decision to internationalize overlaps with the decision to acquire foreign targets. 
Second, there is no reliable data source that identifies greenfield investments. As pointed out 
by Cui and Jiang (2009), even aggregated data on FDI in China is not reliable.
1
 One solution, 
used by Cui and Jiang (2009), is to conduct a survey. However, next to a limited number of 
observations and a possible self-reporting bias, most surveys do not allow for time-varying 
patterns – except if the firms are approached several times (dynamic surveys).  
Most studies on Chinese M&A focus on domestic transactions. Overall, the results are 
ambiguous. For the year 1997, Sun and Wang (1999) find that the performance of reorganized 
companies significantly improved, but they do not find more general support for this 
relationship. For the same year, Chen and Zhang (1999) argue that the cumulative abnormal 
returns of reorganized firms increased, albeit not statistically significant. For the period from 
1994 to 1998, Feng and Wu (2001) contend that reorganized companies exhibited operative 
performance improvements, although the performance declined since 1998. For a similar 
period from 1993 to 2002, Zhang (2003) show that stock returns of acquiring firms decreased. 
From 1999 to 2000, however, Li and Chen (2002) report positive abnormal returns for 
acquiring firms. One reason for these ambiguous results could be that many studies do not 
account for different forms of equity transfers.
2
  
                                                 
1
 The Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China is the best 
data source for Chinese companies, as it covers all firms with revenues exceeding 5 million Renminbi. However, 
the report does not include information on outward FDI. The Ministry of Commerce provides some data on FDI 
– but the data quality and coverage is not comprehensive. 
2
 Gao & Kling (2008) distinguished between transactions among SOEs, nationalisations, privatisations and 
transactions between independent companies. Yet their event study is only based on 134 transactions. 
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We suggest that Chinese mergers are more context-specific, involving a rich spectrum 
of firm-, deal- and industry determinants, as well as internal and external governance 
mechanisms. This particularly applies to cross-border M&A decisions, which most of the 
prior studies neglect.
3
 
 
3. Development of hypotheses 
Recent research on the success of diversification through internationalization paints a rather 
bleak picture for shareholders. Gao et al. (2008) find that internationally and geographically 
dispersed US firms experience a significant valuation discount. This effect is especially 
pronounced for diversifications via M&A. This stands in contrast to Gande et al. (2009), who 
contend that valuation levels of US firms increases with global diversification. As a possible 
explanation for the contrasting results, Doukas and Kan (2006) argue that the global 
diversification discount may only apply to shareholders, whereas bondholders benefit from 
risk-reduction. Particularly for multinationals from emerging markets, Aybar and Ficici 
(2009) show that cross-border M&As do not create value and that more than half of the 
transactions even point to value destruction. Thus, for shareholders of Chinese cross-border 
acquirers we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 1. In comparison with domestic M&As, shareholders of Chinese acquirers do not 
benefit from cross-border M&As. 
Firm specific drivers of internationalization can be based on the Resource-based View, 
which propounds that firms can attain competitive advantage if they possess resources not 
held by others (Wernerfelt, 1984). Amit and Schoemaker (1993) regard resources as the first 
step in the value chain and the driver of capabilities, competencies and competitive advantage. 
                                                 
3
 An exception is Cui and Jiang (2009), who select a strategic behaviour approach to model the mode of entry of 
Chinese firms. Our focus, however, is on drivers of M&A internationalisation and cross-border merger success. 
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In contrast to resources, capabilities are firm-specific (Barney et al., 2001). In addition, firms 
with competitive advantage possess the ability to extract more value from M&A, for 
synergies can be realised easier, and better access to resources (i.e. finance) provides 
additional synergies. Accordingly, firm-specific variables that improve access to resources 
and capabilities translate into competitive advantage, which in turn stimulates 
internationalization. 
Hypothesis 2. Chinese firms with good access to resources and capabilities possess 
competitive advantage that enhances the likelihood of internationalization through cross-
border M&A. 
Hypothesis 3. Shareholders of Chinese acquirers with better access to resources and 
capabilities benefit more from M&A, as the value creation potential is higher due to the 
acquirer’s superior ownership. 
In the merger literature there is ample evidence that corporate and public governance 
mechanisms affect cross-border merger activity and success (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Weitzel 
and Berns, 2006). For Chinese FDI, Luo et al. (2010) use a political economy view to assess 
the impact of policy changes on outward FDI. It is also important to account for regional 
disparities in terms of external governance, for the quality of institutions differs substantially 
within China (Fan & Wang, 2004). In China, corporate governance is a key issue for 
shareholders, as fraud and tunnelling are widespread (Gao and Kling, 2008a). Zhang (2007) 
argue that relying on the market mechanism is not sufficient to enhance corporate governance 
in China. Instead, legal sanctions and enforcement need to be strengthened. State ownership 
and control is a key issue in Chinese corporate governance. Even after years of privatization, 
SOEs still play a major role in China. Apart from state influence through share ownership, the 
State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) exercises 
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considerable administrative control.
4
 For instance, SASAC can appoint top executives and 
plays a vital role in M&As between SOEs. Quiang (2003) contend that the state directly or 
indirectly appoints 69% of all directors and CEOs based on figures for 2001. Accordingly, we 
state the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4. Chinese acquirers with better internal and external corporate governance 
conduct more cross-border M&A, because they have easier access to foreign markets, and 
investors have more trust in their quality of governance. 
Hypothesis 5. Chinese acquirers with better internal and external corporate governance 
exhibit better value creation potential from M&A, because their superior governance helps to 
realise synergies. 
Apart from firm specific resources and capabilities, the industry structure has a 
profound impact on internationalization (Yip, 1992). In addition, corporate governance in 
China is partially industry-specific (i.e. protected industries). Accordingly, we derive the 
following hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 6. Industry-specific effects determine the propensity to conduct cross-border 
M&A. 
Hypothesis 7. The success of cross-border and domestic M&A depends on industry-specific 
effects. 
 
4. Data and definition of variables 
The M&A data refers to the Thomson Reuters Financial M&A database (SDC database). We 
refine the dataset to include only: (1) acquisitions announced between January 1, 2001 and 
December 31, 2008; (2) Chinese acquirers that are publicly listed on one (or more) Chinese 
stock exchanges in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen; (3) acquisitions that do not involve a 
                                                 
4
 SASAC founded in May 2003 supervises the 196 largest SOEs. 
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recapitalization, repurchase of own shares, or a spin-off to existing shareholders; (4) where 
the transaction value of the deal is recorded in the database. This creates a dataset of 4374 
domestic and cross-border transactions by Chinese acquirers. We include corporate 
governance measures from the China Stock Market Research Series (CSMAR) and financial 
variables from the CSMAR and the SDC database. This subset contains 2237 observations. 
In order to test Hypotheses 1-7, we employ two dependent variables. For Hypotheses 
1, 2, 4, and 6, we distinguish between domestic and cross-border M&As by constructing a 
dummy variable (cross) that indicates the acquisition of a non-Chinese target. To test 
Hypotheses 1, 3, 5, and 7, we need a measure of M&A success. Some studies on M&As in 
China, particularly in conjunction with the restructuring of SOEs, use operational measures of 
performance derived from balance sheets (Sun and Wang, 1999). As there are many 
irregularities in the accounting of reorganized firms, balance sheet figures do not reflect firm 
performance reliably (Chen & Yuan, 1998). An alternative approach is the stock return event 
study, which has been and still is the predominant method (MacKinlay, 1997; Zollo and 
Meier, 2008). Significant changes in share prices at the announcement of M&As are likely to 
reflect changes of future firm value. Following Fuller et al. (2002) and Dong et al. (2006), we 
estimate a modified market adjusted model and compute cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) 
for the three day period around the announcement date (-1,+1). 
 
(1) 
Here, CAR_1i is acquirer i’s cumulated abnormal return, winsorized between 5% and 
95%, ri is the stock return on acquirer i and rm is the market return of all other Chinese firms 
at the same stock exchange. We compute short term CARs over three days, because the 
fallibility of asset pricing models for the expected return rm increases with the event window 
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(Sudarsanam, 2003).
5
 As there is no uniquely infallible model, short term event windows are 
less dependent on model specifications, compared to long-term windows.  
The appendix contains the definition of all variables, consisting of (1) deal-related 
variables, (2) firm-specific variables, (3) internal and external governance measures, and (4) 
industry-specific effects. Deal-related variables: In line with the literature on M&A 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Sudarsanam, 2003), we control for a number of 
transaction-specific variables. The method of payment can influence the success of M&A, for 
cash mergers are regarded as positive signals (Tichy, 2001). Therefore, we indicate whether a 
transaction has been primarily a cash merger defined as 90% cash offer compared to the total 
offer price (cash). M&A transactions are classified based on whether the acquirer takes 
control (merger), acquirers an additional equity stake after taking control (acq) or buys a 
minority stake (min). Moreover, we distinguish between horizontal (hor) and vertical mergers 
based on two-digit SIC codes of acquirers and targets. The relative size of the deal (rel_size) 
is a key indicator of M&A success and of the propensity to conduct M&A (Moeller et al., 
2004). Finally, we account for tender offers (tend) and the reasons for selling a target firm to 
an acquirer, namely divestitures (divest) and privatisations (privat). 
Firm-specific variables: We account for the size of the acquirer (size) as a proxy for 
access to resources and the capability to allocate resources (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992), 
financial leverage as a proxy for access to finance (leverage), and profitability measured by 
the return on equity (ROE). High profitability indicates that acquirers possess significant 
competitive advantage. Apart from capabilities directly linked to the business model, one 
could argue that capabilities can be related to the acquisition process. Acquirers with a track 
record of past acquisitions measured by the number of transactions (active) and previously 
                                                 
5
 For robustness we also ran the analyses reported in this paper with CARs for different event windows, namely 
CAR (-1;0) and CAR(0;+1). The results are qualitatively similar with varying significances. 
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purchased goodwill relative to total assets (good) might develop M&A specific capabilities 
that could make future M&A more likely and successful. To control for a potential 
misvaluation effect, the study incorporates the acquirer’s valuation level measured by Tobin’s 
Q (tobin_q). Dong et al. (2006) show that there is a negative relation between acquirer’s 
overvaluation and stock market reactions after acquisitions. 
Governance variables: A substantial proportion of all M&A activities are government 
driven due to the restructuring of SOEs, privatisations and nationalisations. Hence, we 
indicate whether acquirers are SOEs (gov). Following Liu and Sun (2005), we apply the 
pyramid shareholding concept to identify the ultimate ownership of the state. Further, share 
ownership by the acquirer’s management (own_share) may give rise to conflicts of interest in 
a merger (Hartzell et al., 2004). To measure ownership concentration, we compute the 
Herfindahl index, defined as the squared sum of share ownership of the ten largest 
shareholders. To obtain a standardized measure of concentration, we subtract the lowest 
measured index in the sample from each observation’s index and divided the outcome by the 
difference of the highest and lowest index in the sample. The standardized Herfindahl index 
(HI) provides values in the range of zero (no concentration) and one (highest concentration). 
Bai et al. (2004) argue that firms that issued both A-shares and B-shares (or H-share) exhibit 
better corporate transparency and higher market valuation, as they have to adopt dual 
reporting procedures. Hence, we include two dummy variables for firms that issue B- or H-
shares (b_share, h_share). An effective board should enhance firm’s transparency and 
monitoring. In general, the board’s efficiency depends on its size and independence. Jensen 
(1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that a small board (board) is more effective. The 
independence of the board depends on the ratio of independent board members (independent) 
and whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board (duality). Further, the disclosure of top 
executives’ salaries (disclosure) also reveals a board’s attitude towards transparency. To 
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account for regional disparities in the external governance environment, we use Fan and 
Wang’s (2004) regional market function index. The index quantifies the degree of 
development of the regional legal system, enforcement and intermediary organizations (i.e. 
accounting firms and the media) (legal). 
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
Chinese firms exhibit some interesting peculiarities not only concerning corporate governance 
but also their M&A activities. In contrast to other developed or emerging markets, we do not 
observe more than one bidder for a target firm. In addition, only eight transactions were 
regarded as hostile and only one merger could be classified as distressed merger. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics for our sample highlighting the number and type of transactions, 
method of payment, state involvement, deal volumes, and measures of success. 
(Insert Table 1) 
From 2001 to 2004, the number of transactions increased rapidly by 413% - but after 
2004 there was a considerable slowdown of M&A activity that resulted in a moderate increase 
of 21% until 2008. In China, M&A transactions have been influenced by the restructuring of 
SOEs. The slowdown in privatisations coincided with the trough in M&A activity since 2004. 
The involvement of the state reached its peak at 51% in 2003 and declined afterwards to 29%. 
However, deal volume has increased steadily, although the volume per transaction expanded 
mainly since 2005 after the privatisation wave. Another unusual fact is the predominant role 
of cash mergers, which accounted for 96.9% of all M&A. Hence stock is not yet an important 
acquisition currency in China. Compared to developed markets, Chinese acquirers conducted 
fewer cross-border transactions, as only 4.8% of all transactions involved a foreign target, 
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compared to 20.3% in the US and 38.79% in the UK.
6
 In fact, the tendency to internationalize 
through cross-border M&A reached its peak of around 13.3% at the beginning of the 
investigation period and fell thereafter. These descriptive findings do not support the media 
frenzy concerning the wave of acquisitions conducted by Chinese firms. The relatively high 
proportion of domestic M&A can be partly explained by the restructuring of SOEs. When 
excluding the government-led restructuring, cross-border M&A accounts for 6.1% of all 
transactions, which still is significantly below developed markets. M&A seems to be rather 
successful for acquirers indicated by positive means of cumulated abnormal returns (CAR_1). 
Value weighted CARs are lower than equally weighted measures; thus, larger deals are less 
successful, which is in line with evidence from developed markets (Moeller et al., 2005).  
Table 2 reports corporate governance indicators of acquiring firms from 2001 to 2008. 
Most notably, concentration of ownership measured by the Herfindahl index (HI) declined 
over time, which also illustrates the reduction of state ownership. Managers’ shareholding 
(own_share) has been traditionally low in China and does not seem to exhibit any long-term 
trend. The ratio of independent members of the board of directors (independent) showed a 
steady increase from 2% to 33%, which has been driven by government legislation requesting 
that at least a third of board members need to be independent.
7
 The size of the board (board) 
increased until 2004 but declined thereafter, which would support the view that internal 
governance improved, for large boards are commonly believed to be less effective (Jensen, 
1993; Yermack, 1996). Another indication about the improvement of the board’s 
effectiveness is the increase in the duality measure. Duality indicates whether the two 
positions, CEO and chairman of the board, are held by different people. The disclosure of the 
                                                 
6
 The values for the US and UK originate from the same database and are generated with queries that are 
analogous to the Chinese sample in this study. 
7
 This surge might have improved internal governance – but it might be also just a ‘box-ticking’ exercise for 
companies to prove that they comply with new government legislation. 
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salaries of top executives (disclose) became more common over time; in fact most acquirers 
disclose this information since 2007. This pattern reflects a change in policy. At the beginning 
of our investigation period, disclosure of executives’ salaries was voluntary. Due to the lack 
of voluntary disclosure, the government decided to change its guidelines and made it a 
mandatory requirement (at least to disclose the sum of salaries but not the individual salaries). 
In spite of becoming a mandatory item, some companies do not disclosure managers’ 
compensation. Issuing B or H-shares (B-share, H-share) has become less relevant over time. 
Due to tighter regulations, companies that issue B and H-share have to follow more rigorous 
guidelines in terms of disclosure. On the aggregated level, the external regional governance 
environment remained almost unchanged (legal). 
(Insert Table 2) 
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations for all variables, as well as their variance 
inflation factors (VIF). All VIF values are well below the established cut-offs of 5.3 (Hair et 
al., 1992) and 10 (Studenmund, 1992). Thus, multicollinearity is not an issue. 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
5.2 Cross-border versus domestic M&A activity 
Based on our hypotheses, we employ the firm-specific variables related to the Resource-based 
View and the governance variables to analyse the propensity to conduct cross-border M&A 
(Hypotheses 2 and 4). In addition, we account for industry-specific effects in line with 
Hypothesis 6. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, namely to 
internationalize through M&A or not (cross), we apply a probit model, which takes the 
following form. 
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(1
) 
Apart from using industry dummies (Dj), the probit model also includes year dummies 
(Dk) to control for a potential time effect, which might be driven by general policy or 
macroeconomic changes. The probit model refers to maximum likelihood estimation with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent variance estimation. Table 4 shows the results.  
(Insert Table 4) 
The first specification of the probit model (Model A) focuses on Hypotheses 2 and 6, 
whereas the extended Model B also incorporates internal and external governance 
mechanisms to test Hypothesis 4. The number of observations differs between both 
specifications because of missing values concerning governance variables. Due to a different 
sample size, it is not possible to compare specification A and B directly. To assess the 
robustness of the model specifications, we restrict the sample to 815. Re-estimating the model 
specification A based on the restricted sample (model C) shows that the coefficients do not 
differ significantly from the model that includes corporate governance measures (model B). 
Testing the importance of the Resource-based View for the decision to internationalize 
through M&A (Hypothesis 2) implies the null-hypothesis that all firm-specific proxies linked 
to resources and capabilities are equal to zero (H0: 1=…=5=0), which can be tested using an 
F-test. Besides testing the joint hypothesis, we can reveal individual variables that affect 
internationalization. Hypothesis 4 is tested in a similar manner. Next to the three probit 
specifications, Table 4 also shows the results of the F-tests for hypothesis 2, 4 and 6. The 
variable H_share is excluded in Model B as there are no cases of cross-border M&A where an 
acquirer also issued H-shares. The results support all three hypotheses – at least with 
reference to the joint hypothesis tests. Firm-specific variables linked to the Resource-based 
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View (Hypothesis 2), corporate governance mechanisms (Hypothesis 4), as well as industry-
specific effects (Hypothesis 6) all affect the binary choice between domestic and cross-border 
M&A. Exploring partial effects of selected variables provides a more complex picture of 
underlying drivers of internationalization. 
Acquirers that are more likely to enter foreign markets conduct fewer acquisitions 
(active) prior to market entry but exhibit higher goodwill relative to total assets (good). A 
high goodwill relative to total assets indicates past acquisitions, where the purchase price 
exceeded the target’s net value of assets substantially due to intangible assets or synergies (i.e. 
brand, technology). Therefore, cross-border M&A is more likely if Chinese acquirers develop 
experience from a few but substantial transactions with relatively high intangible assets. 
These partial effects disappear in specification B and C; however, a negative impact of SOEs 
emerges. The discrepancy in the model can be explained by the fact that private companies 
exhibit significantly higher goodwill (4.0%) compared to SOEs (2.9%) and private firms 
acquirer fewer targets (3.0 compared to 3.4). Accordingly, the significant impact of goodwill 
and activity in model A is replaced by the dominant underlying factor, namely state 
ownership in model B and C.  
In line with Cui and Jiang (2009), Model B confirms that state-owned acquiring firms 
(gov) are less likely to conduct cross-border M&A. Cui and Jiang (2009) contend that this 
finding might be due to political opposition in the respective host country. In addition, one 
needs to consider that most M&A transactions are driven by the desire to restructure SOEs 
and not to acquire foreign assets. Based on the governance indicators, we cannot argue that 
better governance leads to more internationalization of Chinese firms, as the findings are 
mixed. Acquirers not controlled by the state (gov) and with a separation of the CEO position 
and the chairman of the board of directors (duality) were more likely to execute cross-border 
deals. These measures would indicate better internal governance. Nevertheless, acquirers that 
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internationalized also had higher ownership concentration (HI), which is an indicator for more 
dominant principal shareholders. In developed markets, high ownership concentration 
indicates weaker governance – but the same is not necessarily true in a less developed 
governance environment. In particular, in China the importance of the state declines – but 
another class of companies with high ownership concentration emerges: business groups. If 
we assume that business groups are associated with better internal governance than the state, a 
high ownership concentration does not necessarily imply weaker governance.  
 
5.3 Determinants of M&A success 
To test Hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 7, we need to explain the success of M&A, which includes 
domestic and cross-border transactions, using firm-specific proxies, industry-specific effects, 
and governance mechanisms. The specification of the model is similar to Equation 1, except 
that the dependent variable is the equally weighted cumulated abnormal return around the 
merger announcement (CAR_1), and that explanatory variables incorporate deal-specific 
characteristics. Further, in order to test Hypothesis 1, the model includes a dummy variable 
for Chinese target firms (ch). We estimate the following full specification with ordinary least 
squares and a heteroskedasticity-consistent variance estimator. 
 
(2
) 
Table 5 shows the results of different model specifications of Equation 2 and reports 
the joint hypothesis F-tests, which support Hypotheses 3, 5 and 7. Firm-specific variables 
linked to the Resource-based View (Hypothesis 3), corporate governance mechanisms 
(Hypothesis 5), as well as industry-specific effects (Hypothesis 7) all possess explanatory 
16 
 
power. Due to a high number of missing values after considering governance proxies, the 
sample size declines. To ensure comparability and to assess the relevance of corporate 
governance, we specify a model with and without governance variables based on the same 
sample. Consequently, the model specifications D and E as well as F and G can be compared 
directly. Given the same number of observations, the estimated coefficients do not change 
substantially. Adding governance measures improves the model fit indicated by a higher 
adjusted R-squared. 
(Insert Table 5) 
Model D focuses on the Resource-based View motivated firm-specific variables and 
the control variable Tobin’s Q. Financial leverage and Tobin’s Q have a negative and 
significant effect on cumulated abnormal returns (CAR_1); hence, acquirers with a high 
financial leverage and high valuation level have lower cumulated abnormal returns when they 
announced M&A. Prior empirical literature shows that high valuation levels can trigger a 
contrarian effect to adjust the share price of overvalued acquirers (Dong et al., 2006). For 
acquirers with high financial leverage, acquisitions might further increase their financial risk. 
This has to be seen in light of the high percentage of cash transactions in China. With little 
equity finance, Chinese acquirers need to finance their M&As either with internal sources 
(operating cash flow, retained earnings) or with external non-equity sources. Both worsen 
their financial leverage even more and increase their risk for current shareholders as well as 
debt holders. Chinese acquirers with high financial leverage may therefore have more 
difficulties to access additional capital – a vital resource for harvesting synergies from new 
business combinations. 
Model E incorporates the deal specific variables as defined in Section 4. Financial 
leverage and Tobin’s Q remain to be significant and negative drivers of M&A success. The 
coefficient for the dummy for domestic mergers (ch) is not statistically different from zero, 
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which supports Hypothesis 1. Chinese acquirers do not benefit from cross-border mergers, but 
they are also not worse off when compared with domestic M&As. This is in line with 
previous findings for cross-border mergers by emerging market multinationals (Aybar and 
Ficici, 2009). Although Chinese mergers may, on average, be value enhancing (as shown in 
Table 1), cross-border mergers do not create more value than domestic deals. Cash mergers 
and privatisations trigger a higher market response, but both partial impacts are only 
significant on the 90% level of confidence. Relative size (rel_size) has a significant positive 
effect on M&A success, which is counterintuitive based on empirical evidence for developed 
markets. However, acquisitions in China are very small, as even the largest acquisition only 
reaches 1.2% of the acquirer’s assets. 
Model F includes governance indicators for acquirers, which reduces the number of 
observations. Due to the different sample size it is not possible to directly compare the results 
of model D-E with Model F. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 1 is also supported in Model F as the 
effect of domestic mergers (ch) remains statistically insignificant. Further, as expected in 
Hypothesis 5, the duality of the CEO position and chairman of the board of directors, good 
transparency in terms of disclosing the compensation of senior executives, and firms that 
issue H-shares are associated with higher cumulated returns. This can be interpreted as 
superior ownership in the form of better monitoring and alignment of shareholders’ and 
executives’ interests. Thus, in accordance with Hypothesis 5, we can conclude that Chinese 
acquirers with better governance benefit more from M&As. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyses whether firm-, governance-, and industry-specific effects influence the 
decision to internationalize and whether these drivers impact on the success of M&A 
conducted by Chinese acquirers. By using domestic and cross-border M&A data from 4374 
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Chinese deals announced from 2001 to 2008, the paper contributes the following key insights: 
Chinese cross-border mergers create shareholder value, but not more than domestic M&As. 
We find significantly positive abnormal stock returns for Chinese mergers, both for equally 
weighted and value-weighted measures of success. However, in line with recent evidence on 
the internationalization of firms from emerging markets (Aybar and Ficici, 2009), 
shareholders of Chinese acquirers do not benefit more from cross-border mergers when 
compared with domestic M&A. This implies that there are still sufficient expansion and 
consolidation possibilities within China that are at least as profitable as cross-border 
opportunities. Another result pointing into this direction is the relatively low share of cross-
border M&A in China compared with more mature markets.  
Corporate governance plays an important role in Chinese M&As. Joint hypothesis 
tests show that M&A success and cross-border expansion are associated with internal and 
external governance mechanisms. In particular, government involvement decreases the 
likelihood for international mergers, probably because of political opposition in the host 
country, as contended by Cui and Jiang (2009). Moreover, the government has focused more 
on reorganising SOEs through domestic M&A, which might also explain the low tendency of 
internationalization of Chinese SOEs. A favourable board structure in terms of separating the 
position of CEO and chairman of the board affects the likelihood of cross-border mergers and 
M&A success. The latter is also positively related with proxies for corporate disclosure and 
dual listings at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, which requires tighter regulations. Overall, 
the results support the notion that corporate governance and state ownership are crucial in 
Chinese M&A decision making and success.  
We can confirm that (i) firm-specific determinants that are related to the Resource-
based View as well as (ii) industry-specific fixed effects do not only matter in mature 
economies (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008), but also for Chinese acquirers. Joint 
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hypothesis tests clearly show the explanatory power of these two dimensions, despite the 
idiosyncrasies of the Chinese governance and state ownership system. 
Based on these findings, we can formulate the following recommendations for 
managers and policy makers: (1) improving internal and external governance mechanisms is 
vital to promote internationalization and to enhance the value creation potential from M&A; 
(2) Chinese firms need to focus on maintaining a moderate level of financial leverage to 
ensure easy access to resources, which in turn supports value creation from M&A. The latter 
recommendation might change if capital markets develop further (i.e. market for corporate 
bonds), payment in stock becomes more common, or state imposed restrictions on borrowing 
are abolished. 
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Table 1 
M&A activity, deal structure and success 
 Number and type of transaction Volume of M&A Success of M&A 
year Cross-
border 
Domestic Total Cash 
mergers 
State-
led 
M&A 
Deal 
volume 
($ mil) 
Volume 
per deal  
($ mil) 
CAR_1 
(equal 
weight) 
CAR_1 
(value 
weight) 
2001 18 117 135 91.9% 20.7% 4826 35.8 3.11% -0.66% 
2002 25 279 304 96.1% 39.8% 9386 30.9 0.80% 0.06% 
2003 19 538 557 96.9% 51.0% 9298 16.7 -0.70% 0.00% 
2004 21 672 693 98.1% 41.7% 15690 22.6 -0.58% 0.00% 
2005 30 481 511 95.3% 38.9% 10009 19.6 -0.22% 0.01% 
2006 34 536 570 96.0% 38.9% 28195 49.5 2.17% 0.02% 
2007 40 728 768 97.1% 29.2% 57946 75.5 3.58% 0.01% 
2008 25 811 836 98.6% 29.2% 70292 84.1 -1.18% 0.00% 
Total 212 4162 4374 96.9% 36.8% 205643 47.0 0.54%*** 0.01%*** 
Note: *** p<0.01 
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Table 2 
Change of internal and external governance mechanisms 
year gov own_share HI independent board duality disclosure B_share H_share legal 
2001 0.207 . 0.281 0.024 9.227 0.118 0.279 0.147 0.059 5.808 
2002 0.398 . 0.297 0.071 9.101 0.133 0.020 0.093 0.007 5.898 
2003 0.510 0.000 0.311 0.255 9.788 0.104 0.040 0.074 0.003 5.875 
2004 0.417 0.001 0.283 0.329 10.138 0.128 0.007 0.036 0.002 5.689 
2005 0.389 0.005 0.266 0.344 9.579 0.125 0.044 0.037 0.000 5.909 
2006 0.389 0.002 0.222 0.348 9.404 0.130 0.796 0.065 0.006 5.866 
2007 0.292 . 0.198 0.358 9.500 0.101 0.947 0.035 0.002 5.922 
2008 0.292 . 0.205 0.332 9.305 0.157 0.974 0.045 0.002 5.728 
Total 0.368 0.002 0.243 0.310 9.554 0.127 0.530 0.051 0.004 5.822 
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Table 3 
Pairwise correlation and variance inflation factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity 
VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
CAR_1 1.00
leverage 2.57 -0.04 1.00
size 1.63 0.00 0.03 1.00
ROE 2.58 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 1.00
tobin_q 1.29 -0.01 0.00 -0.20 0.00 1.00
good 1.11 -0.01 0.05 -0.15 0.03 -0.01 1.00
active 1.08 -0.01 0.00 0.22 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 1.00
cash 1.04 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.06 1.00
ch 1.07 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.02 1.00
min 1.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 1.00
acq 1.30 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.22 1.00
hor 1.07 0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.12 0.14 1.00
rel_size 1.31 0.06 0.01 -0.42 -0.03 0.16 0.09 -0.17 -0.14 -0.08 0.07 -0.18 -0.07 1.00
tend 1.04 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.19 -0.02 0.07 1.00
privat 1.24 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.10 0.05 0.06 -0.04 1.00
divest 1.37 0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -0.01 -0.31 -0.22 0.10 0.16 -0.09 0.27 1.00
gov 1.42 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.07 -0.06 -0.08 0.33 0.03 1.00
own_share 1.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 1.00
HI 1.35 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.34 -0.08 1.00
independent 1.21 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.08 1.00
board 1.20 -0.02 0.00 0.26 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.15 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 1.00
duality 1.05 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.08 1.00
disclosure 1.08 0.09 0.02 0.14 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.01 -0.10 0.12 -0.21 0.27 -0.07 0.00 1.00
B_share 1.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 1.00
H_share 1.03 0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 1.00
legal 1.14 0.02 -0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.02 -0.17 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.15 0.02 1.00  
Note: all correlation coefficients larger than |0.05| are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
 
Results of probit estimations (dependent: cross)  
Variable A B C 
leverage 0.00 0.01 0.01 
size 0.01 -0.16 -0.01 
ROE 0.01 0.03* 0.02 
tobin_q -0.06 -0.32 -0.30 
good 2.04** -2.05 -3.02 
active -0.04* -0.04 -0.04 
buy_gov  -1.01***  
own_share  -25.66  
HI  1.49**  
independent  1.25  
board  0.07  
duality  0.49*  
disclosure  -0.46  
B_share  0.43  
legal  0.09  
Constant -6.50*** -2.86 -4.50 
Observations 2028 813 813 
Pseudo R
2 
0.12 0.21 0.14 
F-tests for industry effects and year dummies 
 F-test P-value  
Hypothesis 2 11.20** 0.048  
Hypothesis 4 18.63** 0.017  
Hypothesis 6 261.87*** 0.000  
Year effects 31.33*** 0.000  
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; heteroskedasticity-consistent  
estimator of variance; year and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects  
included. 
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Table 5 
Results of OLS regressions (dependent: CAR_1) 
Variable D E F G 
leverage -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01 
size 0.01 0.12 0.33 0.31 
ROE -0.02 -0.03 0.11* 0.11* 
tobin_q -0.01*** -0.02*** 0.32 0.07 
good -1.15 -1.57 1.2 1.79 
active -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 
cash  1.53* 1.77 1.73* 
ch  0.32 -1.88 -1.95 
min  -0.03 1.33* 1.26 
acq  0.20 0.82 0.75 
hor  0.35 0.31 0.24 
rel_size  0.22** 0.32** 0.37*** 
tend  1.19 1.09 1.76 
privat  1.06* 0.89 1.08 
divest  0.36 0.74 0.65 
gov   0.24  
own_share   6.63  
HI   1.49  
independent   1.05  
board   -0.05  
duality   1.49**  
disclosure   1.79***  
B_share   -0.18  
H_share   3.25**  
legal   -0.14  
Constant -1.89 -2.04 -5.14 -3.43 
Observations 2237 2237 1081 1081 
Adjusted R
2
 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.11 
F-tests for industry effects and year dummies 
 F-test P-value   
Hypothesis 3 4.85*** 0.00   
Hypothesis 5 2.84*** 0.00   
Hypothesis 7 6922.67*** 0.00   
Year effects 3.82*** 0.01   
 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; heteroskedasticity-consistent  
estimator of variance; year and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects  
included. 
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Appendix 
Variables  Type Description 
Panel A: Deal-related variables 
CAR_1 dependent: 
H3,5,7 
cumulated abnormal return of the acquirer for the event 
window one day before the merger announcement until one day 
after (winsorized between 5% and 95%) 
cash control payment method: dummy indicating a cash component >90% of 
the total deal value 
ch Main: H1 dummy indicating domestic M&As (target is a Chinese 
company) 
cross dependent:  
H2,4,6 
dummy indicating crossborder M&As (target is not a Chinese 
company) 
min, acq, 
merger 
control type of acquisition: 
min refers to the acquisition of a minority interest 
acq refers to acquiring equity after reaching 50% of ownership 
(no change of control) 
merger refers to a change of control (acquirer owns less than 
50% before transaction and more than 50% after transaction) - 
reference category in estimations 
hor control dummy indicating horizontal M&As based on identical first 
two digits of SIC codes 
rel_size control Log of the ratio deal value divided by total assets of acquirer  
tend control dummy indicating a tender offer 
privat control dummy indicating that target was privatized 
divest control dummy indicating that target was a divestiture 
Panel B: Firm-specific variables 
leverage main: H2,3 total debt divided by total equity 
size main: H2,3 natural logarithm of acquirer's total assets 
ROE main: H2,3 return on equity 
tobin_q control market value of all firm assets (equity and debt) divided by the 
book value of assets 
good main: H2,3 value of goodwill of acquirer divided by the book value of total 
assets 
active main: H2,3 number of previous mergers 
Panel C: Internal and external governance variables 
own_share main: H4,5 percentage of stocks held by senior managers (board members 
and top management) 
HI main: H4,5 standardized Herfindahl index based on ownership of 10 largest 
shareholders;  
1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of concentration 
independent main: H4,5 ratio of independent directors 
board main: H4,5 size of board of directors (number of directors) 
duality main: H4,5 dummy indicating that CEO concurrently serves as board 
director 
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disclosure main: H4,5 dummy indicating the disclosure of top managers' salaries 
gov main: H4,5 dummy indicating a state-owned acquirer 
B_share main: H4,5 dummy indicating a company with B-shares 
H_share main: H4,5 dummy indicating a company with H-shares 
legal main: H4,5 degree of regional legal system and intermediary organizations 
development 
Panel D: Fixed effects 
industry 
effects 
main: H6,7 64-1 dummies for each unique pair of the first two digits of SIC 
codes 
year effects control 8-1 dummies for each year 
 
